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On the Methodics of 
Common Speech 
A Chapter in the History of 
The Philosophy of Language 
Augusto Ponzio 
l. A text of great topical interest; 2. The a priori in language; 3. Metalinguistics in 
common speech; 4. Common speech and the plurality of universes of discourse; 5. Contri-
butions of the methodics of common speech; 6. Initial meanings and additional meanings; 
7. Criticism of the postal package model; 8. The river under the boat. 
1. A TEXT OF GREAT TOPICAL INTEREST 
The current situation in semiotics and the philosophy of lan-
guage can be characterized in general by the overcoming of that 
phase which we might call the semiotics of the code. This phase 
began in 1916 with the publication of Saussure's Cours de linguis-
tique generale, was still very strong through the 1960s and starts 
to weaken from approximately 1980 onwards. During this period 
This article is related to my preceding studies in the philosophy of language 
and semiotics in Italy, with particular reference to the work of Rossi-Landi. It 
is also part of a book in progress entitled The Adventures of the Sign: People and 
Problems in Semiotics. 
[Translated from the Italian by Susan Petrilli] 
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the following theses dominated: 
1) The (verbal/nonverbal) sign presupposes a code, that is, a 
sign system which is defined and fixed antecedently to the actual 
use of the sign (message) and its interpretation. As a result, the 
difference between sign and signal is suppressed: signs, including 
signifying verbal units (from the moneme to the text), are confused 
with signals (e.g., road signals). Both are in fact determined by a 
preconstituted code, given that the context does not come into 
play and that there is a univocal correspondence between signifiant 
and signifie. 
2) Two fundamental theoretical orientations emerge: one con-
siders the sign from the point of view of the sender and must 
deal, therefore, with the intention of communicating something 
(the semiotics of communication: Buyssens and Prieto); the other 
considers the sign from the point of view of the interpreter, so 
that the sender's communicative intention is no longer relevant. 
In this case the code underlying the sign (viewed as a symbol in 
the psychoanalytical sense) is not necessarily recognized by the 
sender : rather, he or she "discovers" it (semiotics of signification: 
Barthes 1964). A variant of the semiotics of signification is offered 
by the Chomskyan theory of language: communication is not a 
characterizing function of language, and the utterance does not 
necessarily require awareness of the code (transformational 
generative grammar), which only the linguist is in a position to 
discover. 
3) The whole complex process of semiosis in which something 
works as a sign is traced back to two poles: one is collective, stable, 
common and normative-this is the code (langue or grammar in 
the Chomskyan sense); the other pole concerns the use of the 
code by the individual in a free and innovative manner-this is 
usually called the message, parole or utterance. 
4) Nonreferential semantics-that is, a semantics which de-
nies the semiotic pertinence of the referent (Ullman, Jakobson 
1952; Eco 1975)-is opposed to referential extensional semantics, 
which instead considers the referent as a constitutive factor of 
semiosis: we are dealing here with the traditional dichotomy be-
tween intension (connotation) and extension (denotation). 
5) The sign is viewed as an autonomous totality . It is severed 
from both the historical-social tradition to which it belongs genet-
ically as well as from social practice, in spite of the fact that it is 
only within social practice that the sign is used and its sense 
determined. 
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The overcoming of the semiotics of the code is not simply the 
chronologically inevitable result of a sequel in ideas, nor does it 
concern a single specific field of knowledge. Broader changes of 
a sociocultural nature come into play. They lead to wider signifying 
practices and prove to be intolerant of the polarization between 
code and message, langue and parole. Criticism of code semiotics 
is related to the weakening of the centripetal forces of linguistic 
life and of sign-cultural life at large. Such centripetal forces charac-
terize the tendency in semiotics to privilege the unitary system 
with respect to the sign. As it is not possible to consider all these 
aspects here, I will limit my attention to the following: 
A) The semiotics of the "third sense" or the "semiotics of 
writing" (Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva) is theorized as early as the 
late 1960s. It is characterized by the concepts of renvoi, deferment 
and shifting (see the notions of difference and deplacement), which 
act upon the sign so as to free it from the guarantee of a code. 
B) As of 1979-1980 there is a return to Peircian semiotics-and 
not only in the United States . This view is based on the concept 
of sign as what exists only in relation to another sign, which acts 
as an interpretant and so forth, in an open chain of interpretants. 
C) The theories of Mikhail Bakhtin and his Circle become 
known thanks to the translation of his works. As early as the 
1920s Bakhtin criticizes code semiotics and proposes a model of 
sign based on the centrifugal forces of sign-cultural and linguistic 
life. His conception is related to a polylogic and dialectic logic. 
It is surprising that a book containing theoretical perspectives 
which were to emerge only in more recent times (and not without 
great difficulty) was to appear in Italy as early as 1961-that is to 
say, before the advent of structuralism and semiotics. Further-
more, this book is a re-elaboration of ideas which had already 
been conceived and expressed in writings by the same author 
during the fifties. This remarkable book is Significato, comunicazione 
e parlare comune [Meaning, Communication and Common Speech] by 
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. With these writings, the author places him-
self outside the Saussurian perspective, and is therefore free of 
the reductive dichotomy linguistic system (langue!individual 
parole), as well as of the conception of communication as the ex-
change of messages between independent individuals pre-existent 
to the communication process. SCPC is an original attempt at 
making two distinct traditions meet for the first time: the Italian 
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line of thought, with its German and Continental influences at 
large, is made to encounter such trends as British analytical 
philosophy and American pragmatism. More exactly, for the first 
time ever, this book grafts the line of thought that goes from 
Peirce to Morris-together with elements of Oxonian analytical 
philosophy, Wittgenstein's philosophy oflanguage, and Ceccato's 
and Dingler's operationism-onto the trunk of Continental, 
nonidealistic historicism. 
SCPC introduces the original notion of Common Speech which 
indicates all those operations in speech essential to successful 
communication between human beings-and this independently 
from the obvious complications that take place in reality.* What 
is presupposed here is the fact that beyond all possible historical 
and geographical differences, there are basic similarities in the 
biological and social structure of all human communities. 
After this book, Rossi-Landi develops the notion of Common 
Speech into that of linguistic work and sign work in general. 
Subsequently (for the first time in Rossi-Landi 1971: 201), he intro-
duced the still wider notion of social reproduction. It was only in 
1968 with Il linguaggio come lavoro e come mercato [Language as Work 
and Trade] that Rossi-Landi dealt specifically with Saussure-the 
official Saussure of the Cours-even if with his notion of Common 
Speech, he had already distinguished himself from the Saussurian 
perspective. Common Speech was also something entirely differ-
ent from Oxonian ordinary language as well as neopositivistic 
constructions of ideal languages: 
Within all real or possible languages, we can distinguish as a neces-
sary, fundamental and constitutive part a "collective speech" which 
I have for some time referred to as Common Speech to separate it 
both from the Saussurian individual parole and the ordinary or daily 
or colloquial language of the Oxonians, as well as from the technical 
or special or ideal languages of the builders of generic models. In 
a certain sense, it stands as a synthesis of the three conceptions 
which are individually to be rejected. Common Speech is a specifi-
cation of language, not of this or that language alone; and it is a 
social, not an individual, specification. As a specification reached 
through investigation, it retains in part the nature of a special 
language. (Rossi-Landi 1968: Amer. trans. 1983: 40) 
*It should be noted that some of the implications of the Italian par/are would 
be better rendered by speaking rather than speech; the latter term, however, was 
here preferred as being more "common" in English [Tr]. 
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As the author observes under the entry "Semiotics" in the 
Dizionario teorico-ideologico f the journal Ideologie (12, 1970: 38-44; 
now in Rossi-Landi 1979: 301-08), the Saussurian model of the 
sign has the merit of having insisted upon the connection between 
signifiant and signife, or-to express ourselves in Augustinian terms 
which avoid the mentalistic ambiguity of Saussure's signifie-upon 
the union of signans and signatum (see Rossi-Landi 1979: 21ff.). At 
the same time, however, the Saussurian model runs the risk of 
reifying the sign totality thus understood, turning it into an au-
tonomous and separate entity . Compared to such a model-or to 
that offered by information theory as expounded by Shannon and 
Weaver-the sign model developed by Peirce and taken up by 
Morris has the advantage of using the sign situation or semiosis 
as the starting point, and of considering the sign-vehicle, the 
meaning, the referent, the interpreter as well as the very code, 
as nonexistent outside the semiosis totality: all these things are 
no more than different aspects of the same process, that is, the 
articulated process of semiosis taken in its wholeness. 
The notion of Common Speech, however, was introduced by 
Rossi-Landi in his 1961 book in opposition, especially, to the "or-
dinary language" of the Oxonians . In spite of some efforts to the 
contrary, one of the limits of the Oxonian conception consisted 
in its claim of being able to describe ordinary, daily or colloquial 
language in general, while in reality describing the characteristics 
of a given natural language . Such confusion between two levels, 
the general and abstract level of so-called ordinary language and 
the particular and concrete level of a given natural language at a 
given moment in its historical development-in this particular 
case the English language-is recurrent not only in the Oxonian 
conception and in the more recent analyses of language that are 
inspired by it, but also in Chomsky's linguistic theory, where the 
specific characteristics of a language-yet again English-are actu-
ally mistaken for the universal structures of human language. The 
untranslatability of the phrases used by Chomsky as examples of 
his theories is symptomatic of the problem at hand . One of the 
fundamental limits evidenced by Saumjan in the transformational 
model proposed by Chomsky lies precisely in the fact that such 
a model confuses elements which in fact belong to two different 
degrees of abstraction, ideal language and natural language. As 
is well known, Chomsky's model cannot be extended as it is to 
natural languages different from that privileged by his description. 
This leads Saumjan to oppose his bigradual theory of generative 
grammars to Chomsky's unigradual theory by distinguishing be-
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tween two levels of abstraction: genotypic language and 
phenotypic language (see Saumjan 1965). 
The notion of Common Speech is not in contrast to that of 
plurilingualism-that is, to the co-presence of thousands of lan-
guages, each one different from the other. On the contrary, pre-
cisely because Common Speech is nothing more than a similarity 
of functions fulfilled by the various languages in satisfying needs 
of expression and communication, it can explain and justify the 
difference, variety, and multiplicity of the different languages as 
due to the variety in expedients, solutions, and resources that 
each language offers-never in a complete and definitive fashion, 
as language is in continual development and transformation-for 
the satisfaction of the basically similar social needs of expression 
and communication. The notion of Common Speech does not 
neglect or underestimate what, together with George Steiner 
(1975), we might call "the enigma of Babel," that is to say, the 
diversity and the multiplicity of languages, in contrast to those 
tendencies in the study of language that try to reconduct the 
multiplicity of languages to an Ursprache or to the universal linguis-
tic structures of Logos or of the biological nature of man . The 
Common Speech Rossi-Landi speaks of is certainly not the product 
of a mythical unity at the origin of all languages, and even less 
so of a natural law unity of the human species; this is evident 
throughout the entire 1961 book in which the notion of Common 
Speech is advanced, and it is stated explicitly by Rossi-Landi in 
1968 (Amer. trans.: 41), where the same notion is more fully ex-
pressed in terms of work: 
The similarity of the functions fulfilled by the various languages is 
derived from the fact that in the process of language development 
the general forms of social formation, that is, the basic work and 
production relationships that separate any human society from any 
pre-human (only animal) society, are necessarily represented . 
Subsequently, both the notion of expressive and communicative 
needs as well as that of basic social processes were re-examined 
by the author (cf. now Ideologia 1982, 1.3, especially 1.3.5, and 
Rossi-Landi and Pesaresi 1979). 
We said that the notion of Common Speech was formulated 
in contrast to the Oxonian conception of language. This should 
not lead us to believe that at the time of writing SCPC, English 
analytical philosophy was a major interlocutor in either Italy or 
most Continental countries . It did not represent a position to be 
dealt with whenever studying problems of a theoretical order. 
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The pioneer character of Rossi-Landi' s works-begun with the 
monograph on Charles Morris (1953), followed by the Italian trans-
lation and ample comments to Foundations of the Theory of Sign 
(1954), and subsequently by the rewriting in Italian of Gilbert 
Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1955, reprinted in 1982)-was such 
that, apart from some rare exceptions, SCPC appeared in a situa-
tion of almost total ignorance as regards the theoretical orientations 
under discussion. Not only was Rossi-Landi' s research the object 
of misunderstanding as regards the problems he dealt with, but 
his approach even to the study of such problems was also misun-
derstood, discordant as it was with the current dominating concep-
tion of philosophical work. (For a study of these aspects of Italian 
culture, see Rossi-Landi's "Introduction" to the 1980 edition of 
SCPC, and also "On Some Post-Morrisian Problems" [1978], as 
well as his introduction to the American edition of Language as 
Work and Trade.) The paradoxical situation in which the 1961 book 
was written and published was such that it discussed attitudes 
toward interlocutors who were in the main ignored or considered 
unworthy of serious reflection and who might have "overesti-
mated" problems concerning language. In such a perspective, 
Morris appeared to be an "analytical philosopher" or a "linguist," 
while in the best of cases Rossi-Landi's book was itself viewed 
solely as a contribution to analytical philosophy. The local tradition 
to which Rossi-Landi' s work could in a certain sense be seen to 
belong to formed no more than a minority group, the main repre-
sentatives of which were Cattaneo, Peano, Vailati, Calderoni, En-
riques, and Colorni. This meant that the continual reference in 
SCPC to Vailati (one of the most quoted authors in the volume) 
did nothing to hinder the general impression that the 1961 book 
was at the service of Ryle and other analytical philosophers from 
Oxford and Cambridge (incidentally, at the same time Wittgen-
stein too was freely associated with this school of thought, cf. 
Rossi-Landi 1981). 
In some of his well-known essays, Ryle had attempted to 
distinguish between use and usage. To a certain extent this distinc-
tion does in fact correspond to the phenotypic distinction between 
linguaggio and lingua (or, in French, between langage and langue). 
Rossi-Landi goes a step further in trying to identify the general 
conditions of language as seen against both a linguistic and nonlin-
guistic background. It could be said that there is here an existential 
dimension to Common Speech. 
By resolving to explain linguistic use rather than just describ-
ing it, SCPC was already in the line of research which was to lead 
to LWT with its criticism of the notion of use as elaborated by 
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Wittgenstein. In this book, in fact, Rossi-Landi develops a theory 
of linguistic production according to which any linguistic unit can 
be viewed as the product of individual and social linguistic work. 
In the light of such a conception, Wittgenstein's notion of linguistic 
use concerns something which is given only because it has already 
been produced, but leaves out of consideration the question of 
how that something came into existence. Rossi-Landi criticizes 
the notion of linguistic use in terms which are basically Marxian, 
while at the same time taking into account some notions from 
both Peirce and Bradley. Here Wittgenstein is said to lack in the 
notion of labor-value because "from the linguistic objects, he 
moves only forward and never backwards" (LWT: 31). 
In the "Preface to the American Edition" of LWT, Rossi-Landi 
says that many of the ideas in this work "were already present, 
if only in an embryonic form, in the 1961 book." However, I 
believe that SCPC has an autonomous value and that, indepen-
dently of any subsequent developments, it constitutes an impor-
tant event in the philosophy of language. In this sense, I agree 
with Rossi-Landi when he says that the criticism he makes of his 
1961 book in LWT (pp. 26-27) needs to be in some way modified 
(see the "Introduction" to the 1980 edition of SCPC: 25-26). With 
respect to the project of a linguistic-semiotic reflection in the per-
spective of historic materialism, the concept of Common Speech 
could have seemed "mentalistic" and led to the need for a refor-
mulation in terms of social work. If, on the other hand, we consider 
this notion independently of the subsequent development in 
Rossi-Landi's thought, his own criticism is "excessive," and even 
out of place. In his introduction to the 1980 edition (SCPC: 26), it 
is Rossi-Landi himself who, in fact, gives us the key: the theory 
of Common Speech constructs models, that is, it is a theoretical 
construction and not a direct description of real processes, although 
a reference to such processes is obviously involved. This distin-
guishes it from the ordinary language of analytical philosophy as 
well as from Chomsky's notion of competence or of generative 
grammar. Common Speech is a model with interpretive functions, 
a hypothesis applicable to various languages. Rather than being 
a description of linguistic use, the theory of Common Speech (or 
"Speaking") proposes a general model of speaking which is cap-
able of explaining linguistic use and is, moreover, applicable to a 
plurality of languages. In this sense, what underlines linguistic 
use is not at all something mentalistic or in any other way ontologi-
cally pre-existent to natural languages: it is the result of interpretive 
hypotheses which put us into a position to approach real linguistic 
phenomena with an appropriate conceptual instrumentation. 
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Much like Saumjan, in his 1961 book Rossi-Landi proposes a 
bigradual theory of language. This theory explains the concrete 
linguistic use of this or that language (phenotypic level) in terms 
of a common speech hypothesis (genotypic level) whose validity 
increases the more it is extensible to the different languages. Rossi-
Landi himself guides us toward an interpretation of this kind 
when in the foreword to the first edition of SCPC he says that 
both the pretension to a science of sign behavior of the biopsycho-
logical or sociological type, and competition with the analytical 
and historical work carried out by glottologists on the facts of the 
various languages, are excluded. It does not follow from this that 
what I wish to offer is some sort of theory or general doctrine, of 
the cognitive speculative kind, as regards the phenomena under 
examination. Rather, I merely want to offer a structural background 
and make an attempt at clarification. Studying the a priori in 
language does not mean adopting a deductive aprioristic method . 
(1961: 9) 
We could speak then of the hypothetical-deductive method, or 
more properly, recalling the Peircian concept of "abduction," of 
the abductive method in which a given event is explained by 
positing hypotheses on the general conditions that make such an 
event possible . 
2. THE A PRIORI IN LANGUAGE 
"Common Speech" indicates that part of speech which is 
common to the various languages in spite of the differences . When 
we speak, no doubt we speak a particular so-called natural or 
historical language such as Italian or English etc. Furthermore, 
speech is always relative to a specific sectorial language (familiar, 
ethical, scientific, theological, poetic, etc.) of a given national lan-
guage in a specific historical moment. However, even though we 
always speak in a specific national language and in one of its 
particular sectors, it is possible for us to identify a constant and 
common factor. In short, there are repeatable operations in common 
speech that guarantee its relative constancy. Even if these opera-
tions are not completely constant they are, however, sufficiently 
so for them to be regarded as the same operations, and this in spite 
of the variety in languages and linguistic contexts. We may estab-
lish what forms Common Speech by studying the general condi-
tions that make meaning and communication possible. Here, we 
intend "possible" in Kant's sense, so that research orients itself 
as the study of the a priori in language, as the investigation not 
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so much of facts as of conditions that make such facts possible. 
For Rossi-Landi, Common Speech has a methodic function. In 
fact, it is in the light of such a notion that the study of language 
is characterized as a general methodology of language and of 
human speech in its signifying capacity (see SCPC 1980: 158££.). 
Common Speech puts into evidence how language functions, as 
it signals those operations we inevitably perform when we speak. 
In relation to this aspect, Rossi-Landi's investigation is inspired 
by Kantian transcendental logic, which, however, undergoes de-
cisive reformulation. Common Speech insists precisely on what 
was left aside by Kant, that is to say, on the general methodic 
capacity of language . A return to Kant filtered through Cassirer 
(in particular "Structuralism in Modern Linguistics"), the "Kantian 
Peirce" and some British analysts. 
The a priori exists in language. However, it is not to be studied 
in its "expressed linguistic" results, but rather in its "internal and 
hidden structure" (SCPC: 165). There is, here, an implicit reference 
to the "innere Sprachform," which Cassirer borrows from Hum-
boldt and which is connected to the idea of language as energheia 
rather than as a product, that is, as ergon. We could speak of 
taking an ante litteram standpoint as regards Chomskyan "Carte-
sian linguistics" (in his 1966 essay of the same title, Chomsky too 
tries to make Humboldt and Kant enter into his own perspective). 
The Chomskyan conception of language remains tied to the class-
ical alternatives between consciousness and experience, ration-
alism and empiricism, and in this sense it is extraneous to both 
Kantian criticism and the overcoming of the latter by abstract 
rationalism and abstract empiricism. Cassirer continues in this 
approach, which is that of linguistic structuralism. However, he 
affirms the need of not limiting oneself to the structure of language 
in its preconstituted form (as does, instead, a certain structuralism 
of the descriptive and taxonomical type), but rather of highlighting 
the formation process of such a structure. We could say that struc-
tural linguistics, as we find it in Cassirer's late writings, is a dynam-
ical theory in Saumjan's sense: that is, a theory which does not 
identify the synchrony of language with statics, but concentrates 
rather on the dynamic aspect of the synchrony of language. In 
this way, not only does such a theory differentiate itself from 
structural linguistics of the taxonomical type, but also from the 
theory of language as elaborated by Chomsky. Yet Chomsky sees 
no alternative as regards linguistic behaviorism, other than that 
of appealing to the rationalistic philosophy of the seventeenth 
century, and maintains that the only valid approach to the study 
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of linguistic behavior is that offered by mentalism and innatism 
(cf. SCPC 1980: 142; see also my 1971 essay, now in Ponzio 1974). 
Peirce's semiotics is also connected to Kantian philosophy . 
In fact, Peirce proposes a "new list of categories" (see Collected 
Papers 1.545-59) as well as a reinterpretation of the a priori and the 
transcendental, in linguistic and semiotic terms. Peirce's semiotics 
takes an explicitly anti-Cartesian stance too, and refuses the 
rationalism-empiricism dichotomy as unfruitful and abstract (see 
the two 1868 essays, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties of 
Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," 5.215-263, 
& 5.264-317) . 
A similar stance was taken by Rossi-Landi when he main-
tained that Common Speech could be considered as containing 
something a priori, thereby assuming a methodic function. He 
evidences the inconsistency and arbitrariness in the study of mean-
ing as the contraposition between idealism and empiricism, as 
well as that between logico-linguistic inquiry and historicism, to 
which Italian philosophy was still quite tied at the time he wrote 
SCPC. In fact, Rossi-Landi points out how modern historicism has 
given an essential contribution to the study of language according 
to regions and universes. By going back to Vico's historicism, 
Rossi-Landi underlines the importance of the criticism, operated 
by Vico, of the Cartesian model of knowledge which, insofar as 
it is based on evidence and deduction, cannot be applied to the 
historical or "human" sciences. Rossi-Landi also finds the refusal 
of an equal and unitary procedure in Comte. Despite the prejudices 
(still very strong at the time) inherited from Croce and Gentile 
against Comte's positivism, Rossi-Landi acknowledges the impor-
tance of Comte, who insisted on the impossibility of an absolute 
empiricism, and then demonstrated that scientific knowledge does 
not consist in the mere accumulation of facts, but rather in connect-
ing such facts and identifying constant elements upon which to 
construct laws capable of predicting phenomena . 
The pages of SCPC dedicated to Francis Herbert Bradley show 
how a neoidealistic conception inspired by Hegel influenced the 
logico-linguistic method in philosophy. This conception is very 
different from Croce's and Gentile's neoidealism, especially as it 
is deeply rooted in the tradition of scepticism characteristic of 
English philosophy (see pp. 87-95). Bradely's sceptical idealism 
made its influence felt on empiricism: both George E. Moore and 
Bertrand Russell derived something from Bradley's logic; and it 
is precisely here that Rossi-Landi identifies the historical matrix 
of the use of the adjective "logical" together with the terms "em-
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piricism" and "positivism." Logical positivism and empiricism can-
not be traced back to the traditional opposition between idealism 
and empiricism . According to Rossi-Landi, these notions are in-
comprehensible to both those empiricists who have remained tied 
to . a "pre-logic" phase, and to those idealists who still take a 
metaphysical anti-empiricist stance (see 1980: 95-96). 
Rossi-Landi also attaches particular importance to Russell's 
anti-Humean polemics on the logical and not psychological char-
acter of analysis and to the criticism of psychologism in logic 
by such authors as Bolzano, Bradley, Brentano, Frege, Meinong, 
Vailati, Husserl, and Dingler. He does this in view of the overcom-
ing of traditional empiricism in the direction not only of logical 
empiricism but also of what he calls the Methodics of Common Speech. 
All this may certainly be seen in connection to the teachings 
of Kant, who distinguished between anthropology and philos-
ophy. But it may also be developed, as Rossi-Landi proposes, by 
proceeding with Kant beyond Kant, by identifying the a priori in 
language, and by attributing a methodic function to the notion of 
"Common Speech." 
It is Rossi-Landi's conviction that the a priori can certainly be 
identified in language through the methodology of Common 
Speech. This is so because the a priori is connected to thought and 
considered as a model rather than as an event, as the Bild of the 
world rather than as a part of it; but even more, the a priori is 
identifiable in speech, intended here as the "concrete linguistic 
acts" through which language is actualized. Or again, it is identi-
fiable in common speech (that is, that part of speech which concerns 
all humans), understood as a part of social practice, as a system 
of human techniques which are relatively repeatable and constant. 
Repeatability and constance concern fundamental categories, 
structures, signantia-and-signata of various descriptions because 
the human situation, biologically and socially, is what it is all over 
the earth, and this in spite of relevant local variations. 
3. METALINGUISTICS IN COMMON SPEECH 
The constant-and-repeatable is not located in the unitary lan-
guage of a single nation or group of speakers, that is, in the langue. 
As a system of relatively constant human techniques, Common 
Speech is distinguished from natural languages insofar as it is not 
limited to national-cultural spheres, but is rather an international 
phenomenon. The search for what is constant in language does 
not move in the direction of philological studies which are the 
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theoretical expression of the historical processes of linguistic uni-
fication and centralization, of the centripetal forces in language. 
I would say that Rossi-Landi' s research moves in the very opposite 
direction: his investigations go beyond the limits of those linguistic 
studies which search for the constant factors of a single given 
language viewed as a system of linguistic forms. Using a term 
employed by Bakhtin in 1963, we could say that Rossi-Landi's 
research presents itself as a "trans-linguistics," that is, it exceeds 
the limits of linguistics, philology, and philosophy of language in 
which the common factors of speech are identified with the linguis-
tic norms of a given natural language. From this point of view, 
the methodics of Common Speech is also a criticism of linguistic 
and philosophical theories that give expression to forces that may 
serve to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world: it is the 
same critical stance we find in Bakhtin's "Discourse in the Novel" 
( 1934-35, English trans. 1981: 269££.). 
Furthermore, the notion of Common Speech is explicitly 
fashioned as a means of freeing oneself from the pretension of 
explaining all linguistic phenomena with the two notions of system 
of unitary language and individual speaking. 
Much like the rest of Bakhtin' s writings, the already men-
tioned essay "Discourse in the Novel," was completely ignored 
until very recent times. In that text Bakhtin writes: 
Philosophy of language, linguistics and stylistics have all postulated 
a simple and unmediated relation of the speaker to his unitary and 
singular "own" language, and have postulated as well a simple 
realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the indi-
vidual. Such disciplines actually know only two poles in the life of 
language, between which are located all the linguistic and stylistic 
phenomena they know: on the one hand, the system ot unitary 
language, and on the other the individual speaking in this language. 
(Bakhtin 1934-35, Eng. trans.: 269) 
Unaware and independently of this position, Rossi-Landi had 
arrived at analogous critical considerations (see especially pp. 168-
69 of SCPC), as regards linguists and philologists who re-propose 
the dichotomy between the system of language and individual 
speech (the reference in Italy was to G. Devoto, G. Nencioni, A. 
Pagliaro, and B. Terracini). Rossi-Landi points out that these lin-
guists and philologists concentrate particularly on linguistic results, 
rather than studying the general conditions of language which 
make meaning and communication possible. The consequence 
was that they would either take an ideological stance that favored 
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the centripetal forces in language, thus focusing on the concept 
of unitary language, or they would evince the possibility of "lin-
guistic liberty," thus concentrating on the other term of the 
dichotomy, that is, individual speaking. These linguists as well 
as such Italian philosophers as Enzo Paci (1957: 311-19), who did 
not disregard the work of the linguists, examined the permanent-
and-constant in speech in terms of language as a historical institu-
tion, while attributing innovation and creativity to individual 
speaking . In such a perspective, therefore, we have, on the one 
hand, the permanent and constant, what in language is institu-
tional, traditional or objective, and is called inventum; on the other 
we have the inventio, that is, the new and the creative, all that 
which in language is individual and subjective. 
Every reader is certainly acquainted with the fact that in lan-
guage-in any language whatsoever-there are elements which 
remain sufficiently constant and others which change continu-
ously. Whatever is constant, even if relatively so, is what makes 
language possible, in Kant's sense, because with respect to the 
actual use of language it is transcendental. The mutable or flowing, 
instead, is conditioned in two ways: by diachronic variation, and 
by the shifting of contexts and universes of discourse. As Rossi-
Landi says, the methodics of Common Speech "cuts across" the 
dichotomy linguistic institution or inventum and individual speak-
ing or inventio. In fact, what in speech is constant cannot be allotted 
to either of the two poles of this dichotomy . Bakhtin too had 
refused this dichotomy, showing that it could not be made to 
correspond to that between permanence and inno vation: 
A unitary language is not something given (dan) but is alway s in 
essence posited (zadan) [ ... ] . Language[ . .. ] is never unitary . It is 
unitary only as an abstract grammatical system of normative forms, 
taken in isolation from the concrete, ideological conceptualizations 
that fill it, and in isolation from the uninterrupted proce ss of histori-
cal becoming that is a characteristic of all living language. Actual 
social life and historical becoming create within an abstractly unitary 
national language a multitude of concrete worlds, a multitude of 
bounded verbal-ideological and social belief systems; within these 
various systems (identical in the abstract) are elements of language 
filled with various semantic and axiological content and each with its 
own different sound . (1934-35, Eng. trans . 1981: 270, 288) 
On the other hand, innovation is limited even in individual 
speaking: repeated elements are continuously present because of 
the simple fact that, despite efforts of appropriation, words never 
become exclusive private property of the speaker: 
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Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into 
the private property of the speaker's intentions. [ ... ] Expropriating 
it, forcing it to submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a 
difficult and complicated process. (Ibid. 294) 
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Bakhtin's considerations continue a line of thought begun in 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language with its criticism of "indi-
vidualistic subjectivism" (Vossler) and "abstract objectivism" 
(Saussure). 
In 1961 the cultural climate in Italy was such that Croce's 
idealism had not yet been overcome and new linguistic studies 
were not free of the impasse resulting from the dichotomy institu-
tional permanence/individual innovation (a situation which con-
tinued until very recent times). It is against such a background that 
Rossi-Landi elaborates an approach to the relation between the 
"constant" and the "mutable" (or "flowing") in language. He 
maintains that what is constant in language and constitutes the 
presupposition common to the different natural languages, to in-
dividual speech and ideal or artificial languages, is neither to be 
found in the inventum nor in the inventio: 
The inventum can change, and in any case, it too is always historical 
and thus always "flowing"; and the inventio cannot but consist at 
least partially in repeatable operations and uses. In short, to reach 
the "constant," we need the notion of language-in-general-as 
human work. (SCPC 1980: 169) 
At the moment, my interest lies in highlighting the autonomous 
value of the notion of Common Speech as it was initially proposed 
in the first edition of SCPC in 1961. In view of the fact, however, 
that there is a line of continuity between the 1961 book and the 1968 
book (as the last sentence, which anticipates ideas later developed 
in LWT, of the quotation above shows), I will briefly examine the 
1968 book with the intention of pointing out, parenthetically, not 
how but what has developed directly out of the methodics of Com-
mon Speech. Of particular interest is the homonymous chapter of 
LWT (first published in 1965) in which criticism of the dichotomy 
collective language (langue)/individual speech (parole) is recalled. 
Rossi-Landi maintains here that the bipartition language/speech 
must be replaced by a tripartition between collective or common 
speech (now, collective linguistic work), collective language (necessar-
ily founded on common speech), and individual speech (exercised 
upon and with collective language as it uses that assemblage of 
social techniques which go into making up Common Speech): 
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By making langage a simple combination of langue and parole, we 
preclude the study of the collective and communitary techniques 
of language. (Rossi-Landi 1968, Eng. trans.: 39-40) 
Our author returns to the notion of Common Speech in Chap-
ter VI (originally written in 1966-67), paragraph 8, entitled "The 
Notion of Collective Speech and the Use of Models" (Eng. trans. 
pp. 148-52). He affirms that individual speech necessarily requires 
the dialectic co-presence of language (langue) and speech, both of 
which are collective (p. 152). It is a matter of admitting that not only 
language (langue), but speech too is collective. Individual speech is 
secondary insofar as it is formed uniquely on the basis of collective 
speech. Common unitary language (langue) is also relative to 
Common Speech: as a system oflinguistic norms, common unitary 
language is a mere abstraction when taken in isolation from Com-
mon Speech. 
An utterance arises and flourishes in Common Speech, its 
authentic environment. Similarly to the langue, Common Speech is 
anonymous and collective; at the same time, however, similarly to 
individual speech, it is orientated toward specific communicative 
objectives and situated in relations between the speaker and lis-
tener. The relation between individual speech on the one hand, 
and common unitary language on the other, is mediated by Com-
mon Speech. Insofar as it is produced by Common Speech, com-
mon language is never wholly and definitively a language (langue), 
that is, a neutral and unitary system, a univocal and autonomous 
code with respect to concrete communicative and interpretive rela-
tions. Likewise, insofar as it is secondary to Common Speech, 
individual speech in never totally and absolutely individual. The 
individual utterance uses models and techniques taken from com-
mon language and thus lies on the borderline between oneself and 
the other: the individual speaker does not get his words from a 
neutral and impersonal language, but rather uses materials, in-
struments and models which are already a part of collective speak-
ing, his speech is always "half someone else's," as Bakhtin would 
say. Not only individual speaking, but the individuals themselves 
take shape within collective speech: 
There are no speakers without listeners, nor listeners without 
speakers, nor speakers and listeners without messages that go from 
one to the other, and so forth. The whole situation slowly takes 
shape together; and the individual sets himself or herself off and 
assumes a particular position within it only much later. (Rossi-Landi 
1968, Eng. trans .: 149) 
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4. COMMON SPEECH AND THE PLURALITY OF UNIVERSES OF DISCOURSE 
The notion of universe of discourse is central to SCPC. A 
universe of discourse is a linguistic and conceptual organization 
founded on certain fundamental terms expressing one or more 
guiding ideas. All that can be said in a universe of discourse is 
determined by such guiding ideas. Just as the notion of Common 
Speech does not exclude the differences between the various lan-
guages, it also does not exclude the differences between the uni-
verse of discourse or contexts in which words are used. On the 
contrary, it actually conditions the individual utterance to the 
extent that each time we speak, we do not merely speak in this or 
that natural language, but also in a particular context and universe 
of discourse, and we use a language which is familiar, or scientific, 
or theological, or professional, etc. According to Rossi-Landi 
(SCPC 1980: 43), a universe of discourse is an inevitable fact: the 
universe to which any discourse belongs must be identifiable. 
Analogously, any linguistic piece endowed with meaning, from 
the single word to the sentence to complete discourse, is specified 
in relation to the context to which it belongs. 
Just as the plurality of natural languages presents different 
ways of satisfying basically similar needs of expression and com-
munication, the pluridiscoursivity characteristic of a single na-
tional language is indicative of the specific orientations and 
specializations present in Common Speech: in passing from one 
universe of discourse to another, we move along the leading edge 
of human activity, from one operative cycle to another, and con-
sequently we deal with different aspects of the phenomena to 
which operations refer (Ibid.: 83). 
The fact that contexts, universes of discourse and special lan-
guages are manifold does not exclude that factors from Common 
Speech persist in the transition from one universe to another, and 
from one context to another. For example, when a mystic sees an 
angel sitting to the right of another, and when a mason lays a brick 
to the right of another, we are dealing with cases from two very 
different universes of discourse; but this does not at all change the 
meaning of "to the right of." Specific expectations as regards 
words and sentences, individual interpretive operations, and par-
ticular strategies deployed to get at meanings, which belong to the 
normal and ordinary use of language in the customary exchange 
between persons-all these things persist. Rossi-Landi puts this 
into evidence by analyzing our possible attitude toward different 
cases of scarce signification, non-sense, linguistic "strangeness," 
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"non-familiarity" and so forth. And it is precisely through limited 
cases of "strangeness" and "debatability" that we are able to 
examine the common attitudes we assume in the interpretive work 
of all kinds of words and utterances. 
On the other hand, the presence of something constant and 
common to the different universes of discourse does not exclude 
the contextual function of the latter, or deny the importance of the 
context as a totality with respect to its parts. 
Without the constancy of Common Speech we would not be in 
a position to explain what it is that binds the innumerable indi-
vidual "speeches" together (see Rossi-Landi 1968, Eng. trans.: 
148); nor would we be able to explain how it is that the speaker, on 
the mere basis of a limited number of utterances experienced as a 
child, is able to produce an unlimited number of sentences, which 
is proof of a relative noncontextuality of speaking (see SCPC 1980: 
150). Chomsky attempts an explanation of this phenomenon with 
his notions of "generative grammar" and "linguistic competence." 
However, as useful as they might be for a description of the 
noncontextual component in language, these notions are unable to 
explain certain aspects which must not be underestimated, that is, 
the pluridiscursivity and contextuality of linguistic use-and this is 
largely because Chomskyan theory is largely tied to innatistic pre-
suppositions of a biological kind, and leaves aside considerations 
on the notion of communicative competence: 
Contexts always contribute to determining the sense of the linguistic 
material they enclose, to the point, at times, of reversing the effect; 
each proposition, however it may be uttered, is always to be inter-
preted against the right background. (SCPC 1980: 150) 
The double affirmation that there is a Common Speech which 
no universe of discourse, individual speaking, natural or artificial 
language can leave aside, and, at the same time, that all that we 
say, we say in different languages, universes of discourse, and 
contexts, is what orients the methodics of Common Speech toward 
the respect for the plurilinguistic and pluridiscursive character of 
speech. In this way it keeps at a safe distance from the monologic 
temptations that characterize investigations in search of what is 
common in language, as in Chomsky's theory of language: 
To a certain extent, languages, universes and types of discourse are 
independent from each other, even as regards their very function 
concerning the linguistic material they are composed of. (Ibid.) 
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By placing Common Speech as the mediating term between the 
unitary language (langue) and individual speaking (parole), inSCPC 
Rossi-Landi recognizes both the plurality as well as the autonomy 
of sectorial, special or technical languages, of the different uni-
verses, fields, strata and types of discourse, and of contexts (see 
pp. 44-46). It is precisely in this, I believe, that we must recognize 
the unmistakably poly logic character of the methodics of Common 
Speech as it is proposed by the author. 
5. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE METHODICS OF COMMON SPEECH 
Now let us look at how the methodics of Common Speech 
influences our approach to certain fundamental problems concern-
ing language. I will only examine what seem to me to be the most 
important contributions that such a methodics offers. The first is 
the metalanguage employed in the study of language. The second 
concerns the problem of the division of language into the object, on 
the one hand, of logical investigation, and on the other, of empiri-
cal anaylsis . To some extent, this corresponds to the traditional 
division of language into syncategorematical and categorematical 
signs. A third important contribution of the methodics of Common 
Speech concerns semantics. First of all, there is the problem of the 
meaning of "meaning"; furthermore, in connection with this issue, 
we need to re-examine the distinction between intension and exten-
sion; and finally, we have the question of the distinction between 
"initial meanings" and "additional meanings." Other noteworthy 
consequences of the methodics of Common Speech concern, in 
particular, 1) the relations of interdependence between semantics, 
syntax and pragmatics (seep. 171); 2) the problem of communica-
tion between different languages (interlinguistic translation) and 
different universes of discourse (endolinguistic translation); and 3) 
the problem of the definition of the very communication process as 
regards both a) identification of the factors in play in semiosis, and 
b) opposition between the linguistic and nonlinguistic (see pp. 
154-58). In SCPC Rossi-Landi anticipates the approach to these 
problems in his subsequent writings. 
Concerning the language employed in the actual study of 
language, the methodics of Common Speech certainly does not 
exclude use of some sort of "technical" language. However, this 
technical language must always be related to common speech, 
which is its very foundation. As Vailati had already suggested, in 
view of the methodics of Common Speech, technical languages (all 
of them, especially those developed in relation to such methodics), 
must move away from common speech as little as possible. Con-
cerning this last aspect we have Rossi-Landi's criticism of the 
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"technicalism" which characterizes the language of much tradi-
tional philosophizing. He interprets such "technicalism" as the 
expression of total detachment from, or clamorous contempt for, 
the linguistic heritage that speakers have in common, that is, for 
the "indefinite wealth of common speech." Rossi-Landi identifies 
an eloquent example of arbitrary separation from common speech 
in Benedetto Croce's introduction to his Estetica come scienza dell'es-
pressione e linguistica generale: 
Knowledge has two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical 
knowledge; knowledge for the fantasy or knowledge for the intellect; 
knowledge of the individual or knowledge of the universal; of single 
things or of their relations; in other words, it is either a producer of 
images or a producer of concepts. (see SCPC 1980: 172) 
"Technical language is not necessarily a formal language": 
Rossi-Landi makes this extremely important specification against 
certain excesses of formalism in the construction of ideal metalan-
guages often used to avoid the indeterminacy and imprecision of 
common language. In relation to this point, the notions, models 
and abstractions elaborated by Rossi- ~andi distinguish themselves 
from those offered, for example, by Saumjan's dynamical theory 
(up to now we have simply lpoked at the analogies between the 
theories of the two scholars). Saumjan persists in the identification 
of technical and formal language, or at least he considers formaliza-
tion as the highest aspiration of a technical language. On the 
contrary, Rossi-Landi employs a language that in adhering as 
much as possible to the wealth of Common Speech, has nothing to 
do with fashionable formalizations, especially when they prove to 
be useless, misleading and without justification in Common 
Speech. In fact, he often takes terms and expressions from for-
malized contexts in order to deformalize and use them in a broader 
sense. This is the case, for example, of the term "universe of 
discourse" as it appears in SCPC. 
In line with the methodics of Common Speech is also the 
specification-made by Rossi-Landi from the very beginning-
or reduction of the multiplicity of meanings that words have in 
their ordinary use. In the very attempt to fulfill the different and 
multiple needs of expression and communication, such im-
poverishment would be in strong contrast with the orientation 
toward plurivocity proper to common speech (see SCPC 1980: 42). 
We need to be specific about words and expressions but without 
forcefully making them univocal. On the contrary, we need to 
examine the very similarities and differences in the multiple mean-
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ings of words. Such an attitude enables us to appreciate the wealth 
of Common Speech rather than impoverish it. 
Another important aspect of Rossi-Landi's 1961 study is the 
demonstration of the relative lack of relevance of the distinction 
between categorematical and syncategorematical terms, a distinc-
tion often considerd to be objective and unquestionable. Up until 
very recent times (see Eco 1975: 88) there was always someone 
ready to resort to such a distinction as proof of the nonreferential 
character of semantics. If, however, we turn our attention to the 
techniques, models and objectives which remain constant in lan-
guage and which go to form common speech, the distinction be-
tween syncategorematic and categorematic terms loses value-
and this is so because constant and repetitive elements are present 
in both these terms. From this point of view, the methodics of 
Common Speech cuts across the subdivision between syn-
categorematics (involving such terms as "and," "or," "not," etc.) 
and categorematics ("idea," "book," "table," etc.), and evidences 
the impossibility of making such a subdivision coincide with that 
between the constant part of language-object of logical analysis, 
and its flowing aspect-object of empirical analysis: in fact, any 
term whatsoever has its own logic concerning the operations that 
may be performed with it. Two radically different types of terms do 
not exist in language; the differerence, rather, lies in the various 
uses we make of the same term: such a state of affairs enables us to 
identify a relatively constant nucleus in the different uses of words. 
This is what constitutes Common Speech as distinct from the 
flowing part of language which is itself determined by the variation 
of contexts (see pp. 47-49, 124). 
Another distinction which is "cut across" in SCPC is that be-
tween intension and extension. The intension of a single term or 
other broader discourse unit, or more precisely, whal: belongs 
conceptually to each of these linguistic units, is determined by 
what that term or any other broader part of discourse can possibly 
stand for. In fact, the operations we perform in using any linguis-
tic unit and which specify the meaning of a sign or sign complex, 
are operations which enable us to refer to certain things, thanks to 
the concepts which belong to such linguistic units and to the way 
in which they go to form such units. Vice versa, concepts belong 
to given linguistic units and form them in a certain way as a func-
tion of the different ways of referring to certain things. The dis-
tinction between intension and extension also proves to be of little 
relevance-even if this is not true of restricted and formalized 
languages-once it is traced back to the operations we perform 
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when we speak and to the rules that govern such operations. By 
means of these operations and rules, therefore, the methodics of 
Common Speech will distinguish between what is flowing and 
what is relatively constant in language (SCPC 1980: 46-47). In the 
light of such methodics, the distinction between intensional and 
extensional semantics, such as it is proposed by the semiotics of 
codes and messages, is untenable (see Eco: 88-100). 
6. INITIAL MEANINGS AND ADDITIONAL MEANINGS 
The conception of meaning in SCPC takes up Wittgenstein's 
approach to meaning as use and shows traces of a semantics 
inspired by analytical philosophy. However, the influence of 
Morris's semiotics is also strong. In his monograph on this author 
(1953), Rossi-Landi had already stressed the importance of placing 
meaning and signification within the total context of the process 
of semiosis. The properties of being a sign vehicle, an interpretant 
and a referent (distinguished by Morris in 1938 into designatum 
and denotatum) are relational properties relative to any process of 
semiosis: 
"Meaning" is a semiotical term and not a term in the thing-
language; to say that there are meanings in nature is not to affirm 
that there is a class of entities on a par with trees, rocks, organisms 
and colors, but that such objects and properties function within 
processes of semiosis. (Morris 1938, now in 1971: 20) 
This leads Rossi-Landi to state that to say "sign," or "semiosis," 
or "meaning," is almost to say the same thing: the difference is 
given by the fact that using one term instead of another means 
stressing different aspects of the situation (1975: 202). In SCPC 
Rossi-Landi identifies a strong analogy with the semantic concep-
tion of Ryle as expressed in 1957 in his "The Theory of Meaning." 
According to this philosopher, meanings are not things, and 
knowing the meaning of a term, or of other linguistic units, 
means knowing how to use them appropriately. 
In Chapters VII and VIII of SCPC, Rossi-Landi proposes a 
distinction between initial meanings and additional meanings on the 
basis of his methodics of Common Speech. This distinction is part 
of a comprehensive conception in which meanings are not de-
tached from the real processes of communication and interpreta-
tion: 
Meanings are the way we use terms and other linguistic units, the 
operations we perform when we use them, and so forth: in any 
case, pieces of human behavior. (SCPC 1980: 179) 
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"Initial meanings" are meanings given in a direct, immediate, 
explicit, literal, or conscious manner. Meanings belonging to these 
categories are subject to, and more often than not depend upon, 
other meanings which, on the contrary, are indirect, implicit, 
metaphorical, latent, or unconscious. Upon all that we openly say 
is exerted the manifold influence of what we do not say. "Addi-
tional meanings" are those meanings which are not immediately 
present but which in the actual process of interpretation are subor-
dinate to initial meanings-they come later, as it were. Apparently 
simple utterances may potentially refer to infinitely complex 
realms of signification such that the interpreter must draw upon 
himself or herself in order to completely understand the original 
utterance. Thus utterances prove to be pluristratified and this 
pluristratification is not a feature of their internal structure but 
rather concerns their relation to the outside: to other linguistic 
units, to contexts and to what remains of the universes of discourse 
to which the original unit belongs. I do not believe it possible to 
reconcile such a distinction to that elaborated by Chomsky be-
tween surface structure and deep structure. The latter considers 
language separately from its communicative function, and from its 
social, intersubjective and dialogic dimension. On the other hand, 
Rossi-Landi's "initial meanings" do in fact involve experiences, 
practices, values, knowledge of a particular environment, and thus 
speakers ranging from the restricted family group to the broader 
environment of a whole culture. "Additional meanings" are de-
termined by the intersubjective and dialogic character of the prac-
tice of signifying, which presupposes co-knowledge, orientation 
toward the viewpoint of others, and toward various sectors of 
cultural life. The implicit is relative to the receiver of the message 
and increases or diminishes according to the experiences, knowl-
ege, values, and competences that the sender and receiver share. 
Initial and additional meanings are given in the concrete process of 
semiosis and in the relation between signs and interpretants, be-
tween expressive needs and capacities and interpretive needs and 
capacities. By evidencing the multiple and complex stratification 
underlying initial meanings which in themselves are simple, 
Rossi-Landi emphasizes the complexity of the operations implicit 
in common speech: 
The quantity of mental work which, in using language, we all exer-
cise and presuppose continually, is immense, even in the case of 
the most simple sentences in common speech: if on the one hand 
these constitute the small change of the daily exchange between 
men, on the other they always represent complex situations and 
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refer to the enormous social patrimony accumulated by mankind 
during the course of its biological and historical evolution and 
transmitted from one generation to the next through the learning 
of language; subsequently these sentences refer to the habitual no-
tions possessed by all men living in a civil community. (SCPC 1980: 
180-81) 
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The distinction between "initial meanings" and "additional 
meanings" raises questions concerning the recurrent distinction 
between meanings fixed by use, tradition, the common code, on 
the one hand, and mutable meanings connected to a specific 
communication and interpretation context, on the other. It cannot 
be made to correspond to the distinction between meanings of the 
langue and those of the parole: meanings of the parole modify, 
renew or in any case add something extra to what is fixed in the 
linguistic institution by adapting the latter to the context. Instead, 
what corresponds to the distinction between langue and parole is 
that worked out by Volosinov (Bakhtin) in 1929 (see Ponzio 1980 
and 1981), between "meaning" and "theme," and that conceived 
by Peirce between "immediate interpretant" and "dynamical in-
terpretant": the former is fixed by use and tradition, while the lat-
ter is the actual effect that a sign in fact determines in a given situ-
ation of semiosis. To use a recurrent expression in SCPC, I think 
we could maintain that the distinction between initial meanings 
and additional meanings "cuts across" that between meanings 
fixed by use and meanings dependent upon the context. In fact, 
we are able to identify something implicit, mediated and latent, 
not only in meanings dependent upon context, but also in those 
meanings which are far more autonomous as regards the cir-
cumstances of a given communicative situation. The very mean-
ings we share and which are fixed by tradition are more depen-
dent than others upon the implicit, indirect, mediated, hidden, 
absent, remote, secondary, or unconscious in language. In any 
case, initial meanings and additional meanings are present in the 
langue and in the parole, in the "meaning" and in the "theme" 
(Volosinov), in the "immediate interpretant" and in the "dynami-
cal interpretant" (Peirce). 
The correspondence is perhaps greater between Rossi-
Landi's "additional meaning" and the notion of "implication" as 
examined by Volosinov-Bakhtin in a 1926 essay entitled "Dis-
course in Life and Discourse in Poetry." In this essay the author 
shows how the meaning of a real-life utterance does not exhaust 
itself in what is said explicitly and directly-the uttered word is 
impregnated with the implied and the unsaid: 
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A real-life utterance, as an intelligible whole, is composed of two 
parts: 1) the verbally realized (or actualized); 2) what is implied. So 
we may compare a real-life utterance with an "enthymeme." (Vol-
osinov 1926, Eng. trans. 1983: 12) 
Events, experiences, values, behavior programs, knowledge, 
stereotypes, etc. are all implied and are by no means abstractly 
individual and private. From the term "implied" (pad-
razumevaemoe, lit. "under-mind-ed")-says Volosinov-over 
subjective-psychological connotations must be eliminated. As re-
gards the implied part of the utterance in the sense of the above 
text, the individually subjective recedes into the background as 
against the socially objective. What is implied in the utterance is 
the "socially determined and necessary act": 
What I know, see, desire and love cannot be implied. Only what all 
of us who are speakers know, see, love and acknowledge, in which 
we are all at one, can be the implied part of an utterance. [ ... ] 
Thus each real-life utterance is an objectively social enthymeme. 
(Ibid.) 
The implied part of an utterance, says Volosinov (1929), is the 
"real-life context" ("a form of life" as the Wittgenstein of the 
Philosophische Untersuchungen says, even if this expression is in-
tended in a more limited sense: see Rossi-Landi 1968): 
This unified purview u pan which the utterance depends can 
broaden both in space and time. What is implied may be family, 
kinsmen, nation, class, days, years and whole epochs. The implied ele-
ments of an utterance become more and more constant in propor-
tion to the broadening of this shared purview and the social group 
to which it corresponds. (Volosinov 1926: 12-13) 
As much as what is implied may be narrow, it must at least coin-
cide with the actual purview of the two people. In this case, even 
the most ephemeral alteration inside this purview can be implied. 
On the other hand, the broader and more complex what is im-
plied is, the more it is based on the stable and constant elements 
of social life, on essential and fundamental behavior and evalua-
tions: 
Particularly important significance is attached to implied evalua-
tions. The point is that all the fundamental social evaluations 
which develop directly from the specific conditions of the economic 
life of a given group are not usually uttered. They have become the 
flesh and blood of all members of that group, they organize actions 
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and behavior, they have, as it were, fused with the objects and 
phenomena to which they correspond, and for this reason they do 
not need special verbal formulations. (Ibid.: 13) 
7. CRITICISM OF THE POST AL PACKAGE MODEL 
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As Rossi-Landi himself says, the initial meaning, especially 
when it is literal and direct, "floats" upon one or more strata of 
meaningful materials (see SCPC 1980: 201ff.). The qualification 
"especially" indicates the fact that in many cases the initial mean-
ing is not itself literal and direct: for instance, it can be metaphori-
cal as in "that man is a fox." Thus the utterance does not com-
municate initial meaning alone, but also additional meanings. 
From the very moment of its formulation-that is, considered 
from the point of view of he or she who emits it-the utterance is 
conditioned by the meaningful material of the situation it is used 
in. This does not mean that the sender is aware of all the mean-
ingful material which is being communicated, nor that interpreta-
tion must consciously refer to all the additional meanings. 
Rossi-Landi examines the relation "conscious"/"uncon-
scious" (see pp. 207-10) with reference to the communication pro-
cess and in particular to the distinction between initial and addi-
tional meanings. He shows how it is not possible to speak of con-
sciousness and unconsciousness in an absolute sense and on the 
basis of the stratification of the message into initial and additional 
meanings. In SCPC he suggests an approach to the study of com-
munication which is different from the perspective in which it 
was subsequently framed in the debate between the "semiotics of 
communication" and the "semiotics of signification." In fact, con-
trast between the former and the latter arises from the mistaken 
assumption that what is voluntary, intensional or conscious can 
be clearly separated from what is not, and that communication 
may be examined by taking as the starting point situations of con-
sciousness or unconsciousness already given outside the actual 
communication process: in reality, consciousness and uncon-
sciousness are relative conditions obtained within expressive, 
communicative and interpretive (interpretive for the sender also) 
processes. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the fact is that 
semiotics (of communication as much as of signification) as semio-
tics of the code and message-derived from Saussure's Cours and 
information theory-remains tied to the model of communication 
in which the message is posited as an object traveling from one 
point to another. Today this model proves to be more and more 
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inadequate thanks also to the recovery of Peirce's semiotics of in-
terpretation and Bakhtin's philosophy of languge . Such a model 
was already questioned in SCPC. According to Rossi-Landi, 
communication cannot be understood in terms of something 
which passes from point A to point B as though we were dealing 
with a postal package sent from one post office to another: 
What in communication may correspond to the postal package is 
only its vehicle, that is, words insofar as they are physical objects 
which are pronounced or written and heard or seen [. . . ]. But as 
concerns the interpretive process and the quantity and quality of the 
information transmitted, the model of an object which changes 
place is totally inadequate [ ... ] . It would be better, perhaps, to 
speak of an "informative river": we immediately see, that is, capture 
the surface, and we know that underneath is all the volume of the 
moving waters . Enriching the image, we could speak of a boat on the 
river. The first corresponds to "initial meaning," denominated be-
cause it is the more visible and conspicuous, that is, direct and 
immediate, the second, to all the rest. What is communicated is not 
only the boat, but also the river , and we have already spoken above 
of the "floating" of initial meaning upon the thick of meaningful 
material. (SCPC 1980: 207-08) 
In relation to the entire informative flux, we are only able to 
make relative distinctions between conscious and unconscious 
parts. What flows on the surface is the immediately conscious, 
what moves in depth is not immediately conscious. We could 
speak of a succession in degrees of consciousness. In recovering 
the model of mental work as polyphony from Sivio Ceccato (the 
simultaneous flowing of various superimposed melodic lines), 
Rossi-Landi also purports that the initial meaning may be con-
strued as the "main melodic line" and additional meanings as all 
the others. Thus he develops a comparison between understand-
ing music and understanding verbal communication. The notion 
of "polyphony" brings to mind further comparisons with 
Bakhtin. In dealing with these models, Rossi-Landi never does in 
fact convey a sense of finality: models are instrumental to the un-
garbling of such a complex situation. An attempt at a solution, for 
instance (see pp. 222-24), is that a sentence does not simply con-
vey only its own meaning but also instructions for its use. 
In SCPC, as we said before, there is an affirmation that was 
already present in Rossi-Landi (1953), and to which the author 
later returns, especially in his criticism of certain distorted in-
terpretations of Morris's semiotics. It concerns the inseparability 
of the three dimensions of the sign, that is, the syntactic, the 
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semantic and the pragmatic. This view of things is particularly 
rich in theoretical implications: the sign does not exist if not with 
other signs; the sign does not exist if not for an interpreter; the sign 
does not exist if not with a signification or designation, and eventu-
ally a denotation. From this point of view, Rossi-Landi's theory of 
Common Speech provides an important point of reference for 
Chomskyan linguistic theory. In fact, even if Chomsky, in con-
trast to what he had previously affirmed (see Syntactic Structures), 
recognizes the necessity of connecting the syntax to the semantics 
of verbal language, and of examining them together with the 
phonological aspect, he continues to deliberately leave aside the 
pragmatic dimension. In contrast to such an approach, Rossi-
Landi maintains that pragmatics is at the basis of syntactics and 
semantics, just as in their turn syntactics and semantics are at the 
basis of pragmatics (see SCPC 1980: 171). Concerning this point, 
most relevant is Rossi-Landi's specification that signification and 
denotation belong to the dimension of semantics, whereas mean-
ing, intended as having sense or signifying something, "is pre-
sent in all three dimensions." 
8. THE RIVER UNDER THE BOAT 
Today, Rossi-Landi's 1961 study on the conditions that make 
communication possible between human beings is still topical. It 
is rich in indications and orientations that open it to confrontation 
and dialogue with other currently important theories in semiotics 
and the philosophy of language . But the very reasons that make 
for its topicality are what caused this research to be considered in-
comprehensible at the time of its publication, and this contributed 
to its being isolated: in his introduction to the 1980 edition, the au-
thor himself speaks of his research in terms of a "reckless intellec-
tual expedition into an inexistent territory." 
On examining SCPC, I have chosen to concentrate especially 
on the contents, leaving aside aspects that are by no means less 
significant and topical than those examined . For example, in a 
chapter dedicated to communication between different lan-
guages, there are analyses of problems concerning translation as 
well as contributions to "contrastive linguistics." Nor have I men-
tioned Rossi-Landi's style: his shunning of systematic rigidity and 
argumentative hastiness, his deliberately anti-academic tone, his 
ingenious use of amusing exemplifications, his close adherence to 
the semantic, argumentative and dialogic wealth of everyday 
speech. 
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The very reading possible today of this 1961 book is the best 
indication of the fact that only gradually do "additional meanings" 
make themselves felt. For certain works which prove to be particu-
larly rich and stratified, as in the case in question, it is necessary to 
find ourselves outside the context in which they were written 
(Bakhtin speaks of exotopia) so as to fully understand and ap-
preciate their innovative vigor. A look from a distance is necessary 
if we want to frame together the boat and the river which flows 
under it. Today, we can view the whole of Rossi-Landi's research 
itinerary from the early fifties to recent years. Thus, should we 
remain at the level of the immediately and directly conscious, we 
have at least the advantage, for example, of seeing a connection 
between the "methodics of Common Speech," "philosophical 
methodics" and the science of signs. 
